Category:PHI 2323 Exam 2

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Location	HSC 201
Date	Friday, October 18, 2019
Time	11:00

Exam over De Anima

On the Principles of Nature

Definitions

Define and give examples of the following:

potency

that which can be and is not

EX: sperm and ovum are in potency to be man (substantial)

EX: man is in potency to be white (accidental)

act

that which already exists

EX: a particular man (substantial)

EX: the whiteness in a man (accidental)

substance

essential existence, simply speaking, in itself

EX: a particular man

accident

existence in a way or in another

EX: the whiteness in a man

form

everything from which something has existence, substantial or accidental

EX: man, since he is white in potency, becomes actually white through "whiteness"

EX: sperm, since it is man in potency, becomes actually man through the "soul"

matter

that which is in potency to substantial or accidental existence

EX: sperm is matter of man (substantial)

EX: man is matter of whiteness (accidental)

privation

non-existence or inability in act

EX: shapelessness of bronze for a statue in potency

accidental form

that which causes accidental existence in act

EX: "blackness" and "whiteness" of a badger

substantial form

that which causes substantial existence in act

EX: the "soul" of a badger as distinct from the "soul" of another badger

prime matter

that which is potency to substantial existence

that matter which is understood without any form and privation, but rather is subject to form and privation

cannot be defined or known in itself, but only through composite

Accidental Change

• Give an example of accidental change

  hot water becomes cold water

• Why is it that the simple does not change, strictly speaking, but only the composite?

  the water remains the same, but takes on the (accidental) form of coldness

Substantial Change

• Give an example of substantial change

  an apple is consumed and becomes part of the organism that consumed it

• Why is it that the simple does not change, strictly speaking, but only the composite?

  the prime matter composing the apple remains, but takes on a new (substantial) form as part of the consuming organism

Principles of Nature

What are the principles of nature?

matter, form, and privation

De Anima

Book I

Chapter 1

• Why is the study of the soul exact (or rather, more certain)?
• Recall the discussion of the insider's view of things.
• Why is the study of the soul honorable?

Response:

• All knowledge is honorable to some degree.
• Knowledge of soul contributes greatly to advance of truth in general and our understanding of Nature because it is the principle of animal life.
• It is of particular interest to us since we are participants of its nature and are able to experience this participation/existence firsthand.

Book II

Chapter 1

• Explain and argue in detail for Aristotle's definition of the soul as "a first actuality of a body, natural, and composed of tools" (or as our translation says, "the first grade of actuality of a natural body … which is organized" 412a26–412b1)
  • How do we know the soul is something of the body?
  • How do we know soul pertains to substance and not accident?
  • How do we know it is a form?
  • How do we know the soul is first act?
  • How do we know the body of which the soul is the form must be natural and composed of tools?

Response:

1. soul is the life principle in things that are alive, therefore it is something of the body
2. separation of soul from body (death) is substantial change, therefore soul is related to something substantial
3. soul as something substantial must be one of: composite, prime matter, or substantial form.
4. soul is substantial form because soul does not exist in itself
5. substantial form (soul) causes existence in act (living), and there are two types of act: first actuality (being alive) and second actuality (doing living things, like eating, growing, reproducing)
6. soul must be first actuality since it is possible to be alive and not be "doing living things"
7. body can be natural or artificial; all living things are natural
8. natural body can either be composed of tools (e.g., the corpus) or not composed of tools (e.g., a hunk of bronze)
9. Therefore, soul is first actuality of a natural body composed of tools

Chapter 2

Describe the hierarchy of living things and their powers that Aristotle gives.

Response:

1. plants/nutritive: take in nutrition, grow, reproduce
2. animals/sensitive: (nutritive) plus sensing, imagination, movement
3. humans/rational: (sensitive) plus rationality

Chapter 3

What does the analogy Aristotle draws between the powers of the soul and shapes tell us about the soul and its powers?

Response:

The soul, like shape, is impossible to define directly. We can only come to know the soul by examining each of the powers attributed to it

Chapter 4

What is the goal of the nutritive power and the nutritive soul?

Response:

participation in the eternal by prolonging its species through reproduction

Chapter 5

• Defend Aristotle's claims that sensation:
  1. is in some cases passive

     we can't help but sense things that impress themselves upon our senses

  2. is impassible

     we are able to receive the form of something as "other"

  3. has states of potency and act

     sensation involves the ability to sense (sense organs themselves) and the act of sensing

• How is it like and unlike change of quality?

  like change of quality, sensation is passive

  change of quality involves a change from full privation to act, whereas sensation is a change from first actuality (ability to do something) to second actuality (actually doing something)

• How is it like and unlike consideration?

  like consideration, sensation is a change from first actuality (ability to sense/consider something) to second actuality (actually sensing/considering something)

  consideration is active, whereas sensation is passive

• Aristotle seems to hold in this chapter that sensation when working properly is infallible. How might one respond to the obvious counter examples to this view?

  when the senses are working properly, we can trust them; we may falter in our interpretation of the senses.

Chapter 6

Explain the difference between and give examples of proper and common sensibles.

Response:

proper sensibles are the objects of each individual sense (sight/color, hearing/sound, taste/flavor, smell/odor, touch/tangibles)

common sensibles are what can be detected through multiple senses (motion, dimension, shape)

Chapter 12

• What does it mean when Aristotle says that sense "has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter," (424a17–18)?
• Explain the difference between reception in matter and reception in knowing.

Response:

we are able to sense, store, and imagine the form of the thing we are sensing, but the physical matter of the thing we are sensing does not enter our bodies

reception in matter is when something receives another form, replacing its own current form (e.g., a hot stone heating cold water: the water loses its "coldness" and gains the "hotness" of the stone)

reception in knowing is the act of receiving another form as "other" without losing its own form.

Book III

Chapter 2

What does the "common sense" do and what is the argument for it?

Response:

The common sense is responsible for integrating and uniting the other senses.

How do we know that when we touch or smell something, we are touching or smelling the thing that we are seeing? The senses are unaware of each other, so it must be something outside both of them.

Chapter 3

• How do we know that sensation and understanding are different?

  there is a lot of room for error in understanding, but senses are infallible (when they are working properly)

• How do we know the imagination is neither opinion nor sensation?

  the imagination is free to come up with ideas, whereas opinion (thinking) has to be based in reality

  the imagination is able to call to mind images and other sensations without the senses themselves being stimulated

• What are the objects of the imagination called in the Aristotelian tradition?

  phantasms

Chapter 4

• Defend Aristotle's claims that mind is also in some sense passive and impassible.

  like the senses, the mind can't help but receive the thoughts and phantasms impressed upon it by reality, and both are able to receive the forms of the sensed things as "other" without altering their own existence.

• What is Aristotle's argument for the immateriality of mind?
  1. to receive a form, you must first lack it: this is true in material reception
  2. having form inhibits the reception of that form: this is true in sensing, therefore the sense organs are free from all forms they can receive
  3. the mind is capable of receiving the form of "physical body," which applies to all material things
  4. therefore, mind must be immaterial
• What is a universal and how does it differ from Plato's forms?

  universals are "in many and said of many, and one thing by which many are known"

  they are insensible realities drawn (abstracted) from sensible realities

  unlike Platonic forms, universals are constructed by the mind as we learn, not "recollected"

• Explain how Aristotle's theory of abstraction works.
  1. we sense things
  2. sensations are stored in imagination and memory
  3. sensed particulars are compared by the "agent intellect", and commonalities are drawn out as universals
  4. universals are stored in the "possible intellect"
• Why is the mind in a way all things?

  our mind is capable of receiving all intelligible things (universals): the "possible intellect" is capable of "becoming" the universal that we receive.

Chapter 5

• Explain the two different powers of the mind:
  • The undergoing intellect (or "possible intellect"), and

    responsible for receiving the universals

  • The acting upon intellect (or "agent intellect")

    responsible for drawing out universals and enables the "possible intellect" to become any universal

  both are immaterial and immortal, but the "agent intellect" is more honorable (just as the carpenter is more honorable than the wood with which he works)

• Why must there be an agent intellect, according to Aristotle?

  the mind is simultaneously passive and active (potency and act): the "passive intellect" merely receives universals, but something, the "active intellect", has to draw out the universals.

• What necessary role does it play in abstraction?

  agent intellect compares particulars and extracts universals