PHI 1301 Notes on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
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Outline
- End of Human Life? Happiness / Life of Virtue (Bk. 1 [α])
- Virtuous Character
- General account of virtue
- Definition of virtue (Bk. 2 [β])
- On voluntary action and deliberate choice (Bk. 3 [γ]; 1109b30–1115a3)
- Kinds of virtue
- Moral virtues
- Courage (Bk. 3 [γ]; 1115a5–1117b22)
- Temperance (Bk. 3 [γ]; 1117b23–1119b18)
- Generosity (Bk. 4 [δ]; 1119b23–1122a17)
- Munificence (Bk. 4 [δ]; 1122a19–1123a34)
- Highmindedness (Bk. 4 [δ]; 1123a35–1125a35)
- Other virtues (Bk. 4 [δ]; 1125b1–1128b35)
- Justice (Bk. 5 [ε])
- Intellectual virtues (Bk. 6 [ζ])
- Moral virtues
- General account of virtue
- Lesser Characters (Bk. 7 [η])
- Friendship (Bks. 8–9 [θ–ι])
- Pleasure (Bk. 10 [κ]; 1127a18–1176a29)
- Happiness (Bk. 10 [κ]; 1176a30–1181b24)
Book VII
Chapter 1
- Name the three types of character to be avoided.
- vice, incontinence, and brutishness
- Name their contraries.
- virtue, self-control, and superhuman (heroic/godlike) virtue
- List some of the things people say about the incontinent character type.
- knows what he does is bad, but does it because of what affects him
- "someone who tends to depart from his calculation [reason]"
- sometimes called "intemperate" because they are neither self-controlled nor prone to endurance
- called such with respect to spirit, honor, and gain
Chapter 2
- What was Socrates's opinion about the incontinent character type?
- Socrates did not believe in incontinence. He thought that no one knowingly acts against what is best; such acts occur only through ignorance.
- Under what conditions do we pardon a person's failure to stand by his beliefs?
- If a person has doubts about his beliefs (i.e., a "weak supposition") when faced with strong appetites.
- With respect to having excessive and bad appetites, compare the person of temperate character with the person who is self-controlled.
- A temperate person does not have excessive or bad appetites, but a self-controlled person has both.
- Why might one think that a person is superior who does or pursues what is pleasant based on his rational choice by comparison with a person who does the same thing but not by calculation but out of his incontinence?
- The rational person is easier to cure because he could be persuaded otherwise, whereas the incontinent person may continue to act even after being persuaded.
Chapter 3
- Distinguish the intemperate from the incontinent character as at 1146b22–23
- The intemperate person believes he should always pursue pleasure and acts through rational choice.
- The incontinent person believes he should not pursue the pleasure, but does so anyway.
- How does Aristotle characterize the person who does what he should not even as he has knowledge and is actually attending to it?
- He calls such a character "extraordinary."
- What seems to grip incontinent people who have knowledge without using it, making them similar to people who are asleep, mad, or drunk? (1147a14–23)
- They are under the influence of strong feelings and appetites that alter their bodily condition.
- Why aren't animals incontinent? (1147b3–5)
- Animals have no universal supposition; they dwell in the particulars
Chapter 4
- Distinguish necessary pleasures from those pleasures that are worthy of being chosen for themselves. Give examples of such necessity and the "voluntary" pleasures.
- Necessary pleasures are bodily (e.g., nourishment, sex), but voluntary pleasures are not (e.g., victory, honor, wealth)
- Describe the simply (i.e., without qualification) incontinent person. (1148a5–12)
- Someone who is simply incontinent pursues bodily indulgences and avoids excessive pains without thinking rationally.
- Who is the more intemperate: (a) the person who has no appetite or only mild appetite for excesses, but still pursues them and avoids moderate pain, or (b) the person who does so on account of his strong appetite?
- The person with no appetite or mild appetites who pursues them irrationally to avoid excessive pain.
- How is it that one can be blamed for choosing pleasant things that are noble and good in kind? (1148a25–30)
- People are blamed for seeking noble pleasures only in excess.
- Concerning what kind of pleasures is there no wickedness involved, but only excess that is to be avoided as bad? (1148b1–5)
- There is no wickedness in noble pleasures such as honor, caring for parents or children, money, gain, victory; but excess of these is considered bad.
Chapter 5
- Are all things thought to be pleasant by nature? (1148b15–18)
- No, there are some things that are not naturally pleasant but become pleasant due to disability, habit, or wickedness.
- Give an example of someone acting out of a brutish state.
- "the female human … rips open pregnant women and devours their babies", "savages … who are alleged to eat raw flesh, or human flesh, or lend their children to one another to feast upon."
- Give examples of someone acting out of states acquired by disease or habit. (1148b25–32)
- "pulling out one's hair, nibbling one's nails, or even charcoal or earth, and sodomy too."
- What's the common element in the excessive states of foolishness, cowardice, intemperance, or ill-temper? (1149a1–10)
- "Every excessive state … is either brutish or diseased"
- What is admirable about Phalaris?
- Phalarsis restrained himself if he had an appetite to eat a baby or for a deviant sexual pleasure.
- It is possible to be in a brutish or diseased state and not be overcome appetite or desire.
Chapter 6
Compares incontinence with respect to spirit (or the irascible appetite) with incontinence with respect to the (concupiscible) appetites
- Why is incontinence driven by spirit less shameful than incontinence driven by appetite? (1149a25–1149b3)
- Spirit listens to reason to some extent, but hears it incorrectly or partially.
- Appetite listens to reason only in that something may be perceived as pleasurable before it "rushes off to enjoy it."
- Which is easier to pardon: (a) act driven by natural, common appetite, or (b) acts driven by excessive and unnecessary appetites?
- Acts driven by natural, common appetite are easier to pardon since all share these appetites.
- Which of the two feel pain: the one acting with wanton violence, or the one acting from anger? (1149b20–21)
- The one acting from anger, since the one acting with wanton violence actually feels pleasure.
- (a) Which is worse: the brute or the bad, vicious man? (b) Why? (c) By how much? (1150a1–8)
- (a) the bad, vicious man (b) because he embodies a corruption of the human "superior element" (soul) rather than an absence of it, and he can do (c) 10,000 times as much evil as a result.
Chapter 7
- What concerns persons who are incontinent and those who are self-controlled? What concerns persons who are either soft or prone to endurance? (1150a13–16)
- incontinent & self-controlled → pleasure
- soft & prone to endurance → pain
- Characterize the intemperate person (1150a20–22)
- pursues excessive pleasures from rational choice for their own sake and not for any further consequence
- lives without regrets and therefore incurable
- Why is the intemperate person worse than the incontinent person? (1150a27–31)
- not coerced into disgraceful action by appetites (what we mean when we say "no excuse," perhaps?); acts without being affected
- Why is self-control more worthy of choice than endurance? (1150a32–37)
- endurance is a resisting of temptation, whereas self-control is an overcoming of temptation (not being beaten vs. winning)
- Describe the person characterized as soft (1150b1–5)
- not being able to resist what most people can,
- trails his cloak to avoid pain and burden of lifting it
- pretends to be suffering, but does not think he is wretched; merely resembles someone who is wretched,
- Distinguish the impetuous character from the weak character. (1150b19–28)
- the weak character deliberates but does not stand by his decision
- the impetuous character does not deliberate but suffers from predisposition
Chapter 8
- Distinguish the intemperate (or wicked) person from the one who is incontinent. (1150b29–36)
- intemperate person does not have regrets and is incurable
- incontinent person has regrets and is curable
- Describe key features of incontinent people. (1151a1–25)
- like people who get drunk quickly on small amounts of alcohol
- they are not unjust, but they do unjust things.
- can be persuaded easily to change
- gets carried away and thus acts contrary to his correct reason
- With respect to the role of correct reason and the first principle of moral reason, distinguish (i) the temperate (or virtuous), (ii) the incontinent, and (iii) the intemperate. (1151a14–25)
- temperate/virtuous: first principle preserved, acts in accordance with correct reason
- incontinent: first principle preserved, does not act in accordance with correct reason
- intemperate: first principle corrupt, acts in accordance with his corrupted reason
Chapter 9
- Describe the character trait of obstinacy (1151b5–17)
- not easily persuaded to change mind through reason
- character owed to pleasure and pain
- more like incontinent than virtuous person
- Compare the temperate and the self-controlled (1151b33–1152a3)
- neither acts contrary to reason for sake of pleasure.
- self-controlled has bad appetites, temperate does not
- Compare the incontinent and intemperate person (1152a4–7)
- both pursue bodily pleasures
- intemperate thinks it's right, incontinent does not
Chapter 10
- Describe the feature of the incontinent person as developed in 1152a7–32.
- incontinent person has a well-formed conscience (like a city that enacts good laws), but voluntarily chooses to not follow it: he does not attend to his knowledge like one who is asleep or drunk.
- Why are habits so hard to change? (1152a33–35)
- habits become our nature, and nature is very hard to change
Chapters 11–14
Identify at least five illuminating things that Aristotle says.
- Aristotle distinguishes how people perceive and support different views of goodness and pleasure:
- no pleasure is good — goods only come from acts of skill/reason, and pleasure involves no skill/reason
- some pleasure is good, but most is bad — some pleasures are shameful or harmful
- pleasures may be good, but they are not the chief good — pleasure is not an end, but a "coming-to-be"
- Aristotle debunks (3) above by saying pleasures are not a "coming-to-be," rather, they are activities of one's natural state
- Aristotle points out that all humans pursue pleasures (even brutish and temperate/virtuous ones), but what they pursue and how they pursue it are what make their actions good or bad.
- pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain overlap, but they are not the same thing
- Aristotle poses the question: if bodily pleasures are not good, how can we call the pains contrary to them bad?
- the pleasures themselves are good, but pursuit of their excess is what is bad: there is no pain in not pursuing excessive pleasure